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ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS:  RECONSIDERING THE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Melvin J. Dubnick* 
 
ABSTRACT.   While a relationship between accountability and ethics has long 
been assumed and debated in Public Administration, the nature of that 
relationship has not been examined or clearly articulated. This article makes 
such an effort by positing four major forms of accountability (answerability, 
blameworthiness, liability and attributability) and focusing on the ethical 
strategies developed in response to each of these forms.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The relationship between “accountability” and “ethics” has long 
been a concern among students of public administration. Accountability 
has traditionally been regarded as the means used to control and direct 
administrative behavior by requiring “answerability” to some external 
authority. It has deep roots in American constitutional history, and can be 
linked to the principles implicit in the Magna Carta as well as our system 
of checks and balances. In public administration, ethics has most often 
been associated with standards of responsible behavior and professional 
integrity in light of the growth of the administrative state and the 
expansion of discretionary powers to public sector bureaucracies.   
 Issues about the relationship between the accountability and ethics 
were central to the Friedrich-Finer debate of the early 1940s – one of 
core debates that set the intellectual agenda for American public 
administration during the Cold War era. In a 1940 essay, Friedrich 
(1940) argued that the traditional means (e.g., oversight and control) for  
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holding administrators accountable were ineffective and unnecessary. It 
was reasonable, he contended, to defer to the judgment of administrators 
whose sense of professional responsibility and loyalty could be trusted 
when they carried out public policy in the national interest. In response, 
Finer (1941) reasserted the widely held view that, despite the greater 
sense of professional responsibility among today’s administrators, 
democracy still requires enhanced public control and direction of 
administrative agents.  
 That exchange was – and remains – the classic expression of the 
conventional relationship between ethics and accountability in public 
administration (Burke, 1986; Harmon, 1995; Gruber, 1987; McSwite, 
1997).  Fundamental to that view is the assumption that the commitment 
of modern administrators to conduct themselves responsibly (i.e., 
ethically, in accord with “democratic morality”) was not sufficient to 
insure that the will of the people would be carried out. Accountability, in 
the form of external (i.e., democratic ) constraints and controls, was 
necessary as well. Accountability mechanisms were required to render 
the decisions and behavior of public officials responsible, not merely in 
the legal, political or bureaucratic senses of that term, but morally as well 
(Appleby, 1952; Gilbert, 1959; Marx, 1949).  Ethical behavior, in short, 
required the presence of external accountability mechanisms in all their 
various forms. 
 Does accountability foster ethical or morally responsible behavior?  
Despite considerable scholarship devoted to the examination of efforts to 
control the bureaucracy through various accountability mechanisms 
(Aberbach, 1990; Balla, 1998; Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989; 
Harris, 1964; Hood, James & Scott, 2000; Kettl, 1992; Light, 1993; 
McCubbins, & Schwartz, 1984; Rosen, 1989; Wood & Waterman, 1994), 
the existence or effectiveness of the accountability-ethics relationship has 
yet to be systematically examined. A growing body of work on 
accountability implies that it has a significant impact on administrative 
behavior (Behn, 2001; Caiden, 1988; Deleon, 1998; Dubnick & Romzek, 
1991, 1993; Kearns, 1996; Romzek, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 
1994, 2000; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), but none of these studies 
directly address how accountability impacts on the ethical standards and 
strategies adopted by administrators. 
 The barriers to such an analysis have been conceptual and 
methodological. Conceptually, both “accountability” and “ethical 
behavior” have lacked the “sharpness” and clarity (Kaplan, 1964) 




required for analytic purposes. The concept of accountability has been 
characterized as expansive (Mulgan, 2000) and chameleon-like (Sinclair , 
1995) as applied in both theory and practice, and the appropriate 
meaning of ethical behavior has long been the subject of heated debate 
between utilitarians and deontologists (among others) (Beu & Buckley, 
2001; Garofalo & Geuras, 1999).  The lack of progress in 
conceptualization, however, can be attributed to the institutional bias and 
normative ambiguity fostered by our methodological approaches to both 
terms. Accountability and ethical behavior are rarely perceived in 
behavioral terms outside the institutional contexts that preoccupy 
students of public administration. As a result, accountability becomes 
associated with certain institutional forms of oversight and ethical 
behavior becomes tangled in discussions of codes and legalisms.   As 
important has been the inability of analysts to put aside the normative 
“baggage” that accompanies the use of such value-laden terms as 
“accountable” and “ethical” when describing human behavior (Kaplan, 
1964) 
 We can overcome these barriers by adopting a “middle range” or 
“concrete theory” perspective (Elster, 1989, 1998; Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998; Lane, 1997) that allows us to reconceptualize both 
accountability and ethical behavior as “social mechanisms” – that is, in 
Robert Merton’s terms “social processes having designated 
consequences for designated parts of the social structure”( Merton, 1968).  
Applying this approach, we assume a sociological (rather than 
institutional) view of accountability. The sociological view stresses the 
forms and functions of accountability as processes (mechanisms) that 
impact on social actors as situated pressures for account-giving behavior. 
In this essay, we focus on four general types of mechanisms that demand 
account-giving responses: answerability, blameworthiness, liability and 
attributability. 
 Similarly, we regard ethical behaviors as social mechanisms 
constituted as norms and standards of behavior generated as partial 
responses to the pressures created by accountability mechanisms.  In 
contrast to both Kantian and utilitarian views of ethics that rely on the 
existence of a priori knowledge or some universal standard, we assume a 
more naturalistic (Harman, 1977) and pragmatic perspective that stresses 
the functional role of ethics in dealing with social dilemmas (LaFollette, 
2000; Flanagan, 1996; Putnam, 1998).   Our focus is on the development 
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and nurturing of ethical behaviors and strategies in response to major 
forms of sociological accountability. 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Three Approaches to Accountability 
 Analytically, the concept of accountability can be approached in 
three ways: historically, institutionally and sociologically. Historically, 
the term itself has distinctly Anglican and feudalistic roots, and has only 
recently emerged as a universal standard of governance (Dubnick, 1998).  
Mechanisms similar to the modern concept of accountability, however, 
do have ancient roots in Athenian democracy (Roberts, 1982; Elster, 
1999).  More than historical curiosities, both the Anglican and Athenian 
views of accountability offer insights into modern accountability and 
provide standards by which to assess the various approaches that emerge 
from sociological analyses. For present purposes, however, we will focus 
attention on those views derived from the contemporary study of social 
relationships. 
 Institutional perspectives approach accountability as formalized 
means of feedback and control established with governance structures of 
states and corporate entities (Schedler, 1999). This view covers a wide 
range of phenomena, from constitutions to financial reporting standards, 
and has been the dominant perspective in the study of bureaucratic 
accountability (Burke, 1986; Gruber, 1987; Rosen, 1989).    
 Sociological perspectives focus attention on accountability as a type 
of social act that is part of a larger class of social processes or 
mechanisms dealing with the need to repair or overcome damaged 
relationships resulting from “unanticipated or untoward behavior” (Scott 
& Lyman, 1968).  That group of mechanisms includes confessing to the 
action or seeking forgiveness (Tavuchis, 1991), subjecting oneself to 
punishment or retribution (Minow, 1998; Borneman, 1997), engaging in 
“good works” to make amends for the damage done or seeking the 
restoration of one’s good name (Benoit, 1995), and associated behaviors 
that stand as substitutes for (or complements of) giving an account of 
one’s behavior. 




Giving of Accounts  
 Specifically, the social “giving of accounts” occurs when one must 
justify or provide excuses for the action that resulted in the faux pas or 
untoward act that is the focus of attention (Scott & Lyman, 1968). One is 
essentially not denying either active or passive involvement in the 
particular indiscretion, but is engaging in an effort to explain why one 
ought not to be held either fully or partly responsible. Justification 
involves accepting responsibility for the act, but denying the immorality 
or untowardness of the behavior’s consequences. Excuses, in contrast, do 
not deny the negative consequences of the acts in question, but argues 
that the account giver had no choice but to act badly and was therefore 
not responsible (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Sykes & Matza, 1957).  In this 
sense, an individual is “accountable” to the extent that there exists an 
expectation (Cava, West & Berman, 1995) within the community that 
they would provide an explanation for any act regarded as worthy of 
account giving.  
 While standing as a distinct type among the class of associate 
mechanisms relating to repairing damaged relationships, account giving 
may also serve as a necessary complement to the other forms. The 
expectation to provide a justification or excuse for one’s actions may 
include a demand for an accounting even if the individual confesses to 
the act, apologizes, and submits to punishment or undertakes restitution. 
Consider the case of Scott Waddle, commander of the submarine U.S.S. 
Greeneville that collided with a Japanese vessel, the "Ehime Maru", 
south of Hawaii on February 9, 2001. The incident, which led to nine 
deaths, was the subject of a military court of inquiry, and by April 
Commander Waddle had accepted “full responsibility and 
accountability” for the accident and made several widely publicized 
apologies. But in this instance, and others like it, the public admission of 
guilt and expression of regret and apologies did not preclude the 
requirement for an accounting of what took place. Thus, with each public 
appearance, Commander Waddle had to relive the incident and provide 
an account of why he acted as he did. 
 In contrast, there are some acts of omission or commission 
considered so despicable that no amount of excuses or justifications 
would be acceptable . For example, Adolph Eichmann, Albert Speer, and 
other Nazis offered defenses of their actions based on accounts that they 
were just “following orders,” carrying out their civic and legal “duties,” 
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or (in the case of Speer) unaware of what was taking place despite their 
prominent roles in the German war effort (Arendt, 1976; Sereny, 1995).  
No account giving in the form of excuses or justifications was perceived 
as acceptable. 
Typology of Account-Giving Mechanisms  
 With its focus on actions taken in response to social expectations, the 
sociological perspective can generate a useful typology of account-giving 
mechanisms. Expectations relevant to providing an explanation for one’s 
behavior can be viewed along two dimensions. First, the expectations can 
be related to specific actors or they can focus on situations. Second, the 
expectations setting or environment can be highly structured and 
relatively stable or emergent and subject to fluctuation. Figure 1 
illustrates the resulting forms of socially relevant accountability 
emerging from relating these two dimensions. 
 In the sections that follow, we describe the distinctive features of the 
resulting four types of account-giving mechanisms and discuss the 
relevant literature associated with each. As important, we briefly 
consider the implications of each for generating ethical behavior 
mechanisms among those being held accountable. As we will see, 




Types of Accountability 
Expectations are: Structured Emergent 
Related to Persons A. ANSWERABILITY B. BLAMEWORTHINESS 
Related to Situations/ 
Events 
C. LIABILITY D. ATTRIBUTABILITY 
 
 
TYPE A: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-ANSWERABILITY 
Demanding Answers  
 Role-specific expectations for account giving are those found in 
highly structured social relationships where the tasks and obligations of 
individuals are either clearly articulated (i.e., formalized) or so 
“institutionalized” (in the sense of “regularized”) that they are perceived 




as inherent to the position a person is occupying (Turner, 1978; Biddle, 
1986).  We label this form of accountability “answerability” to stress the 
idea that persons who fall in this category are expected to respond to 
calls for giving an account upon demand. In short, that expectation 
comes with their role. This conceptualization of accountability is among 
the most commonly used, and has been central to contemporary studies 
of democratic and organizational accountability (Caiden, 1988; Schedler, 
1999). 
 Within democratic theory (Held, 1996; Pitkin, 1969), accountability-
as-answerability indicates a relationship between the governors and the 
governed involving mechanisms requiring the former to inform the latter 
of actions taken on their behalf (i.e., in their “interest”), and allowing the 
latter to judge and take action against the former based on that 
information. The specific mechanisms involved range from 
accountability through elections (Fearon, 1999) and mediated procedures 
(such as a “vote of no confidence” in parliamentary systems) (Laver & 
Shepsle, 1999) to the creation and strengthening of “horizontal” 
institutions such as courts and ombudsman offices (Schedler, Diamond & 
Plattner, 1999).  Accountability-as-answerability has also played a 
central role in classical and contemporary organization theory, where the 
central problem has been to develop mechanisms (e.g., chain of 
command, limited span of control) and related strategies for creating and 
sustaining cooperative social systems (Barnard, 1968; March, 1958; 
McGregor, 1960). 
Answerabilty Research 
 There have been several streams of research associated with 
accountability-as-answerability mechanisms, each applying a distinct 
model of the social relationship involved and generating a different 
picture of the ethical implications of answerability. One stream models 
answerability as a relationship between an accountable individual and the 
audience to which he or she must provide the account. In a series of 
articles published in the 1980s, Teltock and his colleagues found that 
being told one must provide a justification for a decision had a 
significant influence on the individual’s approach to each decision 
(Tetlock, 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).  Moreover, 
individuals put in such situations were motivated to seek the approval of 
their perceived audiences, leading Tetlock to develop an “accountability 
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theory” emphasizing the view of answerable individuals as “intuitive 
politicians” “whose primary goal is to protect their social identities in the 
eyes of the  key constituencies to whom they feel accountable” (Tetlock,  
Skitka & Boettger, 1989). 
 In contrast, a principal-agent theory stream provides a contractual 
context within which answerability mechanisms and relationships are 
used to overcome the inherent “moral hazard” and “selection” problems 
principals face when relying on an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller, 1992; 
Moe, 1995; Waterman & Meier, 1998). Here the answerability 
mechanisms are regarded as structural responses to dilemmas created by 
the effort of rational principals attempted to control rational agents, each 
pursuing their own self-interest. 
 A third research stream, the “new institutionalism,” regards 
organized behavior as dominated by rules and institutional norms, and 
would treat answerability as part of that rule -structure (March & Olsen, 
1984, 1989, 1995).  The accountable individual is a rule -follower whose 
actions are governed by what March and Olsen termed, the “logic of 
appropriateness.”  Under this logic, accountability-as-answerability is 
dominated by three questions: What kind of situation is this? Who am I 
(i.e., what is my identity or role)? And what is the rule I should follow 
given my identity and the situation? (March, 1994). 
Answerability Ethics  
 The three perspectives on accountability-as-answerability 
present us with alternative models of the accountable actor, and thus 
imply three models of ethical behavior mechanisms. The ethics of 
Tetlock’s intuitive politician are driven by the psychological need to be 
accepted by the “audience” – in the case of elected officials, the 
electorate or the people; in the case of a public administrator, the client 
or supervisor or stakeholder. This can result in an approach that judges 
the ethicality of actions on the basis of their strategic value (Paul & 
Strbiak, 1997).  The ethics of the rational self-interested agent is shaped 
by that individual’s calculation of what actions will best suit his or her 
interests, whether those interests are focused on the accumulation of 
power, the accumulation of wealth, or some other goal (Bøhren, 1998; 
Brehm & Gates, 1997).  The rule -follower’s ethics is primarily shaped by 
role expectations and the individual’s social identity – a fact that leads 
him or her to select the most “appropriate” action among alternatives 




based on assessments of what best fits that identity and set of 
expectations.  
 What these three ethical roles share in common is a reliance on 
exogenous signals or structures. The intuitive politician is constantly 
monitoring his or her audience for signals about appropriate behavior, 
while the rational agent is engaged in ongoing calculations about that 
behavior that will provide the best payoff. The rule -follower, in the 
meantime, is always engaged in balancing the expectations associated 
with his or her social identity with the demands of the situation. All three 
look outward as they make their ethical choices, and all three reflect a 
concern for the consequences of their actions. In that sense, Type A 
accountability tends to make administrators rely on various forms of 
ethical mechanisms stressing the consequences of their actions vis-à-vis 
the expectations of those to whom they are answerable. This stress on 
consequences will, in turn, lead to the adoption of ethical strategies 
drawn from teleological schools of ethics (Scheffler, 1994), giving 
logical support to the various models of bureaucratic behavior applied or 
implied in many positive, political and organizational theories. Among 
positive theories of bureaucratic behavior, mechanisms rooted in  
utilitarian ethics (act, rule and motive) are the assumed position for 
administrator actions. Similarly, political theories of bureaucratic 
behavior emphasize mechanisms that enhance the influence and power of 
agencies, while organization theories focus on the striving for autonomy, 
security and resources. Implied in all these models is a set of ethical 
strategies closely linked to Type A accountability. 
TYPE B: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-BLAMEWORTHINESS 
Status-Based Accountability 
 While accountability is most often thought of in terms of 
answerability, it is not always applied to persons in specific and defined 
roles. Blameworthiness as a form of accountability involves a shift in 
focus from specific roles and contractual obligations as an agent to one’s 
perceived social status and membership in some group that has status. 
While role identifies what tasks and functions you perform, status 
implies power and influence within the organization (Stryker & Macke, 
1978).  Put briefly, one is held accountable not because of one’s tasks or 
formal responsibilities, but because of one’s relative social position or 
identification with a certain group. Thus, you are held accountable 
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because you are regarded as a socially, if not organizationally, 
blameworthy (Dubnick, 1996). 
 In its most extreme form, Type B accountability involves 
“scapegoating” – that is, imposing blameworthiness on a group simply 
by characterizing it as the source of the undesirable condition (Douglas, 
1995; Girard, 1986).  It is, in Peter Gay’s words, the construction of a 
“convenient Other” upon whom one can visit all the blame for any 
problem – and against whom we can target our anger and aggression 
(Gay, 1993).   
 But accountability-as-blameworthiness can take less extreme forms 
as well. In military organizations, for example, those at the highest 
echelons of any unit are deemed blameworthy and accountable for events 
that occur on their “watch.”  This form of accountability differs from 
mere answerability, which is related to whether one is performing one’s 
specific role. Here the primary issue is one’s status as the commanding 
officer that is most important.  
 A relevant case is that of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 194l. There is no 
question that the devastation wrought by Japan’s forces was causally 
responsible for the damages suffered on that “day of infamy.”  Yet both 
Admiral Kimmel and Lt General Walter Short, who was Commanding 
General of the local Army contingent, were officially blamed and 
sanctioned for the state of “unreadiness” at Pearl Harbor on the morning 
of the infamous attack, and their careers were ended despite their 
potential value as commanders in the war that followed (Cohen & Gooch, 
1991).  Similarly, in a statement issued in July, 1997, then-Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen held Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier 
“personally accountable” for the lax force protection that led to the death 
of 19 American service personnel at the Khobar Towers bombing a year 
earlier (Cohen, 1997).  The facts in both cases indicated that there was 
more blame to go around than that visited on Kimball, Short or 
Schwalier, but that is not the way accountability operates in the military. 
“In the military,” observed Judith Shklar, “responsibility has to be 
personalized at the highest level of the organization since its system of 
command is built on the principles of obedience and reliance…. We 
cannot afford to be philosophically discriminating when our security 
depends on maintaining the principles of hierarchical responsibility for 
victory and defeat, especially the latter” (Shklar, 1990, p. 63). 




Blameworthiness In Public Service Cultures 
 While accountability-as-blameworthiness is an accepted part of 
military culture (and can be found in some organizations that model 
themselves after the military, e.g. some police forces), it is rarely evident 
in other formal organization contexts. However, it is a pervasive 
presence in the extra-organizational contexts of public service. Our 
government and its agents operate in a culture where officials are 
implicitly held blameworthy for all possible misfortunes, regardless of 
causal responsibility (Dubnick, 1996; Shklar, 1990).  A hurricane is an 
act of nature, but government meteorologists will be held accountable for 
forecasting its exact point of impact as well as expected intensity, and 
local emergency preparedness offices will be blamed if proper steps were 
not taken to deal with the storm’s impact. In the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
issues were raised about the competence and culpability of the U.S. 
intelligence community as well as security at America’s airports. Within 
two weeks of those tragic events, the media began to castigate the 
policies of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for its 
inability to track aliens who remained in the country illegally. Like other 
public sector agencies, they were blameworthy; unlike others, they were 
called into account for their implied role in facilitating the devastating 
attack. 
 What is involved in this form of accountability comes close to what 
is traditionally termed “moral responsibility.”  As Marion Smiley notes, 
in both its Christian and Kantian forms, moral responsibility implied the 
existence of some higher or external authority. Under those forms, 
blameworthiness was a matter of whether one was in a position to violate 
the norms of those universal standards that constituted morality. But in 
discussing accountability-as-blameworthiness, we are focused on the 
social construction of blameworthiness and the social practice of blaming 
(Smiley, 1992).  We are blameworthy as a result of our status within a 
community (e.g., the mayor) or organization (e.g., the general), and not 
due to any specific task responsibilities or actual authority; and we are 
blameworthy because we are members of a group whose members are 
regarded as blamable (e.g., bureaucrats, politicians), and not because 
anyone in that group could really be an effective agent. 
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Type B Ethical Responses 
 The ethics of those facing Type B accountability is necessarily 
pragmatic in the broadest sense of that term, and can take three forms 
beyond the mere passive acceptance of one’s fate as a blameworthy actor. 
First, accountability-as-blameworthiness can be approached 
instrumentally. Faced with the social reality of blameworthiness, the 
accountable individual should use the situation to deal with the 
challenges within that context. The heads of agencies that have been 
subjected to severe criticism for past performance can use the 
opportunity to strengthen the organizations capacities for the future. In 
response to their experiences as field-level soldiers in Vietnam, the 
officers who rose through the military’s ranks from the mid-1970s 
through the 1980s developed ethical strategies that literally transformed 
the role of the armed forces in U.S. policy as well as the way the military 
was perceived by the public and perceived itself (Woodward, 1991; 
Kitfield, 1995).  An equally dramatic transformation of the ethical and 
operational norms of the Federal Emergency Management Agency took 
place under James Lee Witt, who assumed his position in April 1993 in 
the wake of severe criticism for FEMA’s handling of recent disaster 
relief efforts.  
 A second approach is to assume a commitment to a deontological 
moral standard (Chandler, 1994) that would meet with widespread 
approval within the community or organization. The call for public 
administrators to focus on “service” rather tan “steering” (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000), to engage in the pursuit of the “public interest” 
(Huddleston, 1981-82; Marx, 1949), to adopt a professional standard of 
social equity (Frederickson, 1997; Marini, 1971), or to “refound” itself in 
the regime values of the constitution (Wamsley & Wolf, 1996; Wamsley 
et al., 1990), are part of this effort to fill the moral void implied by the 
condition of blameworthiness.  
 The third approach is to engage in an “identity shift” by dissociating 
oneself from the blameworthy status or group. Under the view of social 
constructivism, just as certain groups are regarded as blameworthy, so 
other groups are inherently praiseworthy. In lieu of a tag such as 
“bureaucrat” or government employee, one can stress a professional 
identity such as city planner, park ranger or law enforcement official. 
These identity shifts, in turn, have implications for the type of 
accountability and ethical standards one is subject to. Of course, as social 
constructions, the blameworthiness of these identities can vary from 




place to place and overtime. Police officers in a small midwestern town 
will faces a different set of community expectations than their peers in 
New York or Los Angeles; similarly, the status and perception of an FBI 
agent in the 1990s was quite different from that of the 1950s. 
 Common among these three Type B responses is the establishment 
of credibility for public administrators as autonomous ethical actors. The 
post-Vietnam era commanders focused on establishing and articulating 
basic rules for the use of military force – rules that sometimes led them 
to openly resist putting U.S. personnel in harm’s way when other options 
were available. The military professionalism represented by the likes of 
George Patton was replaced by the model provided by Colin Powell and 
his cohort (Campbell, 1998). The call for the public service professional 
to give priority to general ethical commitments is also a step toward 
asserting an ethically autonomous position, as is the effort to create a 
distinct professional identity among the public service professions. Each 
of these is a means toward the realization of Carl Friedrich’s model of 
the responsible administrator.  
TYPE C: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-LIABILITY 
Law-Like Situations  
 In contrast with accountabilities based on the expectations related to 
persons, Types C and D accountabilities focus on the structure of the 
situation in which actors operate. Although posited as distinct types, 
accountability-as-liability and accountability-as-attributability would 
more appropriately be described as forms found at opposite ends of a 
continuum. At one end are highly structured contexts in which 
expectations are well defined and clear to all; at the other extreme are 
situations so vaguely defined that they almost devoid of stable 
expectations. Our present focus, Type C accountability, falls on the 
“highly structured” section of that range. 
 As implied in its name, accountability-as-liability is closely 
associated with a legalist view of the world in which actions are guided 
and assessed according to rules that carry sanctions for non-compliance 
(Shklar, 1986). Unlike answerability (Type A), where expectations for 
accountability derive from the actor’s institutional role or organizational 
position, liability stresses the requirements of the structured situation. 
The nature of that structure can vary from the strictures of legal 
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requirements backed by state sanctions to implicit contracts between two 
parties that carry with them rewards for compliance and/or sanctions for 
violations. At the core of all these mechanisms is the idea that law, in a 
very general sense, is an effective way to establish and maintain order 
and control (Pound, 1997; Schuck, 1999). 
 In a strictly formal sense, accountability-as-liability would be limited 
to shaping one’s actions according to the “letter of the law” – that is, 
doing what is required by law, and avoiding those actions prescribed 
under law. For Type C accountability, however, the conception of law is 
much broader, taking on the characteristics of both an institutional 
setting (i.e., the “rule of law”) (Ingram, 1985; Hayek, 1972) and a 
context for social relationships (Fuller, Elelman & Matusik, 2000; 
Minow, 1990, 1997; Weber, 1978).  
Issues of Liability 
 The relationships between Type C and other forms of accountability 
are quite complex for two related reasons. First, ours is an 
“organizational society” where individuals are constantly identified by 
their role or status. It is rare to find a structured situation where one is 
completely without some role identity. Accountability-as-liability, 
however, tends to focus the act and its consequences rather than the actor 
or her status-derived blameworthiness. In its most stringent form, Type C 
accountability seeks out the actor who “did the deed” (was directly, 
causally responsible) rather than the individual “in charge” or playing 
some other relevant role. Thus, an individual in a supervisory role/status 
would not be held accountable unless there was both evidence and 
willingness to link that person to the untoward activity.  
 For example, in the case of the infamous 1969 My Lai massacre, the 
U.S. Army felt that it had to treat the event as a legal case, and in so 
doing it found its ability to hold people accountable severely limited. 
Taking the legal liability route, the Army charged Lieutenant William 
Calley with the premeditated murder of at least four civilians. Several 
others in command positions at the scene of the massacre (which 
involved at least 175 to 200 deaths) were initially charged, but it was 
later decided to drop those charges in all but one additional case due to 
“insufficient evidence” – a standard reflecting the legal nature of the 
accountability approach being applied. The exception was Captain Ernest 
Medina, Calley’s immediate superior officer, who was also brought to 
trial charged with murder. There was a difference, however. The murder 




charges against him were not for specific acts of premeditated killing 
(although evidence indicates that he killed at least four civilians at My 
Lai); rather, he was charged with 102 murders under a provision of 
military law that allowed prosecution of those with command 
responsibility. He was court-martialed and acquitted of those charges. 
Thus, although the military could have (and did in many cases) hold 
many more persons blameworthy under its Type B accountability 
approach (and subject to organizational sanctions), it held only Calley 
legally liable for four of approximately 200 deaths and sentenced him to 
twenty years in prison. By focusing on liability, in other words, and not 
pursuing specific counts of premeditated murder again Medina and 
others, the military was unable to fulfill the need for accountability-as-
liability. 
 This leads to the second issue associated with Type C accountability: 
the problem of collective responsibility (French, 1997).  Just as the legal 
system has difficult dealing with collective responsibility (Stone, 1975), 
liability-based accountability systems are constantly challenged by the 
“many hands” problem (Thompson, 1980).  As Dennis Thompson notes, 
typical solutions to this problem include applying “hierarchical” or 
“collective” forms of responsibility, and he finds both wanting. In their 
place, he advocates applying “personal responsibility” approach based on 
some weak causal connection between an individual and the event. In 
terms of the present framework, that would mean shifting from Type C 
to either Type A or Type B accountability – a move that raises issues 
regarding the integrity and fairness of any sanctions that might be 
imposed. As important, such an approach does not deal with the complex 
situations where even a weak causal link cannot be proven. In such cases, 
even the legal system has had to modify its standards by allowing 
liability to rest almost entirely on an individual possible “fault” rather 
than cause (Thomson, 1984).             
 As with its legal equivalent, the inherent problems of accountability-
as-liability are many (Howard, 1994b; Huber, 1988; Levmore, 1994; 
Lieberman, 1981). Nevertheless, it is an approach to accountability that 
is extremely important in public administration. A central factor shaping 
Type C accountability for public administrators has been the judicial 
treatment of two issues: administrative discretion and administrative 
immunity. Historical shifts in the judiciary’s handling of administrative 
discretion and delegation of authority cases (Horwitz, 1994; Stewart, 
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1975) have altered the jurisdictions and tasks of administrative agencies 
to such a degree (some have argued) that we have witnessed a de facto 
constitutional transformation of the American republic (Lowi, 1979).  
The courts’ willingness to lift the cover of sovereign immunity over the 
past several decades (Rosenbloom, 1983, 1987) has been as significant in 
its impact on the accountability, exposing administrators to legal actions 
and making it urgent for them to become more “constitutionally 
competent” (Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000).   
 But as significant has been the general impact on public 
administration of the legalistic mindset fostered by these developments. 
Almost every area of public management has shown signs of deference 
to the “lawyers” perspective, and an abandonment of the administrator’s 
view of the world (Dimock, 1980).  The very act of entering the public 
service places one in a distinctive legal relationship to the state 
(Rosenbloom, 1971), and efforts to assure public employee integrity 
through Type C approaches have been pervasive and often 
counterproductive for the day-to-day operations of government 
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996).   
Law-Like Ethics  
 The ethics related to Type C accountability have their roots in 
distinct and conflicting conceptions of law. Two approaches emerge 
from debates among philosophers regarding the nature of law, while a 
third is derived from the analogical reasoning used in the practice of law.  
 In the philosophy of law, a major division exists between those who 
assume laws to be human artifacts without any inherent moral value (the 
positivist school) and those who assess laws in terms of their relation to a 
higher law standard (the natural law school). Each of these schools 
generates a number of ethical positions, but for present purposes we will 
offer them in caricature as the positivist ethics of obligation and the 
naturalist ethics of conscience.  As applied by those who are held 
accountable, the ethics of obligation calls for adherence to the explicit 
rules that define a situation. Here we find the ethics of neutral 
competence that has been so central to the norms of American public 
administration (Kaufman, 1956; Lockard, 1962; Finer, 1936; Rourke, 
1992).  The ethics of conscience, in contrast, is manifest in efforts to 
have public administrators adhere to some “higher standard” when 
engaged in the enforcement or implementation of the law. Here, again, 
we find various standards from “regime values” and “public interest” to 




“social equity” and “justice-as-fairness” (Frederickson, 1997; Marshall & 
Choudhury, 1997; Rohr, 1989, 1998). 
 A third ethical approach relevant to Type C accountability comes 
from the practice of law. Sunstein (Sunstein, 1996) offers the term 
“analogical reasoning” to describe the type of thinking that takes place in 
legal practice. It is reasoning that focuses on applying laws and rules to 
specific cases based on how that law or rule has been applied in the past 
to similar (although not identical) cases. Sunstein highlights four features 
of analogical reasoning. First, it is based on the norm of “principled 
consistency” – that is, the need to provide some principle to “harmonize 
seemingly disparate outcomes.”  Second, there should be a focus on the 
details of the case, letting the facts shape the decision. Third, analogical 
reasoning avoids the application of any “deep or comprehensive theory” 
that might overwhelm the facts of the case. Finally, this form of 
reasoning produces and applies standards that should be at a “low or 
intermediate level of abstraction.” In public administration, the ethics of 
“constitutional competence” advocated by Rosenbloom and Carroll 
(Rosenbloom, 1987; Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000) operates at 
this analogical level by focusing on the need for public service 
employees to become familiar with their place and responsibilities within 
the U.S. constitutional system through relevant cases. 
 The common thread holding these Type C ethical strategies together 
is their commitment to determining what is ethical through a reasoning 
process – one guided by rules, the second by a higher standard, and the 
third through analogy. In contrast to the stress on consequences 
(generated by Type A account giving) and blame avoidance (through 
Type B), the ethical approaches of Type C accountability rely on ethical 
behavior mechanisms that call for an actor to engage in a certain type of 
reasoning that fosters consideration of procedural requirements, legal 
standards or precedent (Raz, 1990). 
TYPE D: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-ATTRIBUTABILITY 
Relevance of Nonwork Expectations  
 Accountability-as-attributability brings into consideration those 
arenas of social life where the rules and roles of public administration are 
seemingly irrelevant, but in fact are potentially quite important in the 
environment of accountability of public sector workers. It involves those 
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contexts where the fact that an individual holds a certain position in an 
organization, or that one is subject to rules and constraints in the 
workplace, is of little or no consequence most of the time. It is the 
context of the “nonwork domain” where one lives a “private life” distinct 
from the public life of the government job. Or so it seems. In fact, 
accountability pressures spillover into the private lives of all employees – 
public and private. 
 In the nonwork domain, one is subject to accountability standards 
that are broader in scope, more diverse, and constantly subject to change 
over time and from place to place. The sources of those standards are 
other social actors in the domain who regard an action or behavior as 
requiring an accounting by some actor. In short, they attribute  an action 
or behavior to an individual and would expect an accounting if they were 
in a position to demand one. This attributing behavior is regarded by 
social psychologists as part of our standards means for making sense of – 
and dealing with – the world (Forsyth, 1980; Crittenden, 1983; Howard, 
1994a).  From the perspective of “attribution theory” research, this form 
of attribution is subject to ideological, cultural and stereotypical bias 
(Howard & Pike, 1986; Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz, 1993) as well as 
situational determinism (Holloway & Fuller, 1983). In addition, 
attributions tend to be unstable and malleable by changing conditions 
such as information or expectations (Tetlock, 1985; Yarkin-Levin, 1983; 
Tetlock, 1981).  The shortcomings of such attributions, however, have 
not diminished their relevance. 
Being of “Suspect” Character 
 The link between specific instances of attribution and our Type D 
accountability emerges when those attributions lead to the perception of 
an individual as someone of suspect character given the actions attributed 
to him or her. Thus, an individual seen emerging in a disheveled state 
daily from a local bar might be regarded as a “drunk,” and someone cited 
by police for speeding might be characterized as a reckless driver. An 
attributed behavior becomes a character attribute, and it is the fact that 
we are subject to such characterizations that can make us Type D 
accountable.  An individual whose actions in private life are found to be 
questionable or potentially embarrassing to his employer is likely to find 
him or herself being held accountable for those actions – despite their 
irrelevance to the employee’s tasks or functions. 




 This is especially true for those who hold public office. In the private 
sector, the relevance of Type D accountability pressures is likely to 
depend on a number of factors, including (but not limited to) one’s 
position and status in the organization and the nature of the nonwork 
behavior that triggers the concern. Is the individual a highly visible 
employee whose offense impacts on the public image of the business?  
Was the behavior so offensive that the presence of the individual will 
result in significant losses in sales or productivity unless something is 
done?         
 Exposure to this form of accountability is unavoidable, and yet 
students of management have paid little attention to it (Cozzetto & 
Pedeliski, 1996, 1997).  Scholars have long acknowledged the 
intermingling of social and personal factors. They were central to the 
work of the human relations school, and played an important role in 
Barnard’s classic analysis of executive management (Barnard, 1968; 
Roethlisberger, 1941).  Interest in the relationship of family life to work 
has produced a stream of research in sociology and organization studies 
(Cohen, 1995; Bielby, 1992) including the examination of strategies 
developed to deal with the boundaries between work and nonwork 
(Kirchmeyer, 1977/1993, 1995).  There is also research focused on the 
nonwork lives of public sector workers in particular (Romzek, 1989; 
Johnson & Duerst-Lahti, 1991; Romzek, 1985).  But, with few 
exceptions (Dworkin, 1997), little of this research considers the link 
between personal life and accountability. 
Uniqueness of Public Office Holding  
 The rules that protect one’s private life from public intrusions do not 
necessarily apply to those in public offices. While modern society might 
proffer the “principle of uniform privacy” as a desirable standard for all 
its citizens, for public office holders it is the “principle of diminished 
privacy” that is more likely to be applied. There are a variety of reasons 
for this, including the perceived necessity to know more about the 
behavior of those who wield power over us as well as expectations that 
public officials must achieve a higher standard of conduct in their private 
affairs than ordinary citizens (Thompson, 1987). 
 Of course, accountability-as-attributability is not limited to those 
who hold public office. What kind of accountability is involved?  Some 
of it takes the form of formal constraints on the private, nonwork lives of 
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government employees. Hatch Acts, conflict of interest legislation and 
related policies are designed explicitly to deal with the perceived dangers 
of having civil servants too actively engaged in politics or private 
business enterprises (Rosenbloom, 1971; Thruber, 1993; Roberts, 1992; 
Rosenbloom, 1988). Other examples are found in managerial strategies 
to offset the potentially adverse impact of private preferences. The 
possibility that employees or their families might grow too attached to 
local communities (“going native”) has led some agencies to establish 
personnel transfer policies to minimize the influence of nonwork factors 
(Kaufman, 1967).  Concern for an agency’s reputation or public image is 
also used as a rationale for holding employees accountable for their 
private behavior and lifestyles. Private behavior has been regarded as 
grounds for adverse personnel actions, even if the behavior had little or 
nothing to do with the position of workplace (Lewis, 1997).  As 
significant, the courts have held that the “perception” of questionable 
private behavior can be used to take action against a public employee 
(see Wild v. U.S., 1982) (Stark, 1995). 
Type D Ethical Strategies 
 The ethical responses to Type D accountability pressures are likely 
to require that the individual accept the linkages between one’s personal 
and professional/work lives. Two assumptions are at work here. First is 
the assumption that individuals accepting a public office does so with the 
expectation that they will be subject to diminished privacy and greater 
scrutiny of their behavior. Second is the fact that in today’s complex 
social world, efforts to carve out a private space free from the intrusions 
of work or public life is all but impossible. At least some aspects of the 
behavior attributed to the individual in his or her personal life are 
relevant to how that individual will be viewed in his or her working life – 
and vice versa. This fact of modern social life means that the ethical 
demands of work life often overlap or intrude into the ethics of personal 
life, a phenomenon that has been at the center of many of the most 
popular and influential studies of American social dynamics over the past 
half century (Bellah et al., 1985, 1991; Whyte, 1956; Coleman, 1982).  
The result is the blurring of the lines between one’s personal and work 
life ethics.  
 Thus, the individual must constantly contend with an existential 
conflict between ethical demands generated by one’s role expectations, 
perceived blameworthiness or liability, and those related to one’s 




standing as an autonomous private individual or citizen. In some cases, 
the solution would be an ethical position that subordinates at least some 
of one’s personal autonomy to the demands emerging from Types A, B 
or C accountability. Accepting the limits on one’s citizenship rights is the 
price paid under certain Hatch Act provisions, just as the Forest Ranger 
accepts the order to move her family to the next assignment station. As 
significant is the choice to subordinate one’s private tastes and behavior 
to the demands imposed by one’s job or status (Hummel, 1994; Denhardt, 
1981). 
 A more positive stance has been articulated by Terry Cooper in his 
calls for a “citizenship ethics” that he later presents as the “responsible 
administrator” model (Cooper, 1991, 1998). Subordination of the 
personal is replaced with a commitment to continuously reflect on one’s 
life as a public administrator. Implied is the idea that one can achieve 
self-actualization through such an ethical stance, an idea that traces back 
to ancient ethics and its emphasis on ethics as a means for achieving the 
good (e.g., happiness) in oneself (in contrast to the modern focus on 
achieving the good for others) (Annas, 1992). 
 At a more general level, the response to Type D accountability might 
be the adoption of a virtue or character ethics approach. In an 
environment where standards and rules are ambiguous or unstable, it 
would be reasonable to assume that a consistent adherence to some 
higher standards of personal conduct (e.g., to be trustworthy, honest, 
benevolent, caring) would provide some protection from the whims of 
accountability-as-attribution. Some have articulated this in terms of 
being a person of “good character” (Luke, 1994). It can also involve a 
commitment to act virtuously on and off the job as the situation requires 
(Frederickson & Hart, 1985, 1997; Hart, 1984, 1994; Hart & Smith, 
1988), or at least to avoid falling prey to the “ordinary vices” that 
plagued us in both our private and public existence (Shklar, 1984). 
 The ethical path selected in response to Type D accountability 
pressures has implications for the general orientation of the individual 
toward the other forms of accountability. Deference to the intrusions of 
accountability-as-attributability is most closely associated with the norm 
of political neutrality that has characterized mainstream public 
administration for many decades. A “citizenship ethics” is likely to 
complement the effort to promote competency-centered ethics, while 
implied in the virtue/character ethics approaches is a view of the public 
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administrator as a more actively engaged autonomous ethical agent who 
understands his or her moral obligations (Bowens, 1998). 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Among the various issues raised by the Friedrich-Finer debate, those 
focused on accountability-ethics relationships are at once the most 
significant and least explored. Despite the lack of explicit attention to 
that relationship in the public administration literature, there are 
obviously considerable resources that can be brought to bear on this topic. 
Through the reconceptualization of the key terms in that relationship, this 
essay opens the door to a more thorough examination of the relevant 
issues.  
 Such an examination would begin with a further elaboration and 
empirical validation of the associations summarized in Figure 2. If those 
posited relationships are validated, the implications for our 
understanding of administrative behavior can be significant. By focusing 
on accountability and ethical norms and standards as social mechanisms, 
we can start to re-explore the “black box” of “contingent” administrative 
behavior that has been so central to public administration scholarship 
since Herbert Simon began to model the administrative decision maker in 
the 1940s. Relying on social mechanisms in lieu of models and positive 
theory assumptions about bureaucratic behavior, we are able to consider 
various forms of reasoning and “reasons” that help shape administrative 
choices and behavior (Elster, 1989; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). 
 There are also potential implications for those concerned with 
institutional design and administrative reform. Reformers who advocate  
FIGURE 2 
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greater accountability, for instance, typically put forward suggestions 
that create or enhance answerability mechanisms. A more fully 
elaborated “theory” of the relationship between accountability and 
ethical strategies would help us assess the potential impact of alternative 
forms of answerability as well as explain the success or failure of various 
reforms. The same logic could be useful in highlighting the source of 
current problems. What might otherwise be perceived as an arbitrary 
abuse of discretionary authority, for example, might be back to the 
absence of (or an indifference to) Type C accountability mechanisms. 
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